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Ethnic Externalities in Education and Second Generation Immigrants
Firat Yaman1
I analyze the role of ethnic and native human capital – defined respectively as the average years of school-
ing of ethnic groups and of natives within a specific region – and of ethnic concentrations in the educational
attainment of second generation immigrants in Germany. Compared to natives’ children, parents’ education has
a small and insignificant effect on second generation immigrants’ education. Ethnic concentrations have a nega-
tive effect, while ethnic capital is insignificant. The effect of native capital, too, is insignificant but much larger
in magnitude than the effect of ethnic capital. For women, mother’s education is relatively more important. For
men, ethnic concentrations constitute a stronger impediment to educational attainment than for women.
JEL classification: I20, J15, R23
Keywords: 2nd generation immigrants, ethnic capital, ethnic concentration
1City University London. This paper was written as part of the Marie Curie Research Training Network on ‘Transnationality of
Migrants’ TOM, which is funded by the European Commission through the Human Resources andMobility action of its Sixth Framework
Programme (EC Contract No. MRTN-CT-2006-035873). I am indebted to my thesis supervisors Jason Abrevaya and Daniel Hamermesh.
1 Introduction
In many European countries the educational achievements of immigrants’ children trail those of natives’ chil-
dren.2 A recent OECD (2009) study compares educational and labor market outcomes of children of immigrants
and finds that for the classical immigration countries Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States “the
children of migrants have education and labor market outcomes that tend to be at least at par with those of the
children of natives.” Similarly, Dustmann et al. (2010) demonstrate that in the United Kingdom immigrants’
children close initial test score gaps over the course of their compulsory schooling. A very different picture
emerges for Austria, Germany and Belgium. Test scores from the OECD’s Programme for International Student
Assessment (PISA) reveal that test score gaps between children whose parents were born in Germany and native
children of immigrants amount to the equivalent of about at least two years of schooling. Part of the gap can
be explained by the children’s socio-economic background, notably the education of parents, but even after con-
trolling for those factors a substantial and significant gap remains. The study confirms the results by Riphahn
(2003) on the educational attainment of 2nd generation immigrants in Germany. Riphahn finds that substantial
gaps in education relative to natives’ children exist and moreover that they do not seem to shrink over cohorts.
The children of immigrants from guest-worker nations, notably Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, and Italy, are
particularly disadvantaged.
In light of the very different selection of immigrants to the Anglo-Saxon countries compared to continental
Europe (e.g. a point-based immigration policy in Canada, or highly educated immigrants from Commonwealth
countries in the UK vs. low-skill immigration to other European countries), the concept of ethnic capital as
introduced by Borjas (1992) emerges as a possible explanation for these different experiences with the second
generation. The idea put forward by Borjas is that the average human capital endowment of a certain immigrant
group exerts an externality on the human capital accumulation of a child belonging to that group. In a follow-up
paper Borjas (1995) specifies the transmission mechanism of ethnic capital as neighborhoods and reports some
evidence for the importance of this channel.
2See Dustmann and Glitz (2011) for a comprehensive overview of the literature on education and migration, including the inter-
generational transmission of human capital among immigrants.
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The innovations of the present paper are 1) the theoretical and empirical extension of the human-capital
model in Borjas (1992) to include both ethnic and native capital, 2) allowing for the marginal effects of those
variables to vary with the ethnic concentration in the region of a 2nd generation immigrant’s upbringing, and 3)
linking educational outcomes of immigrants directly to completed educational outcomes of their children using
a 25-year running panel study. The last point requires me to confront the substantial panel attrition (partly due to
return migration) that inevitably occurs over such an extended period of time. Furthermore, the possibility that
immigrants sort along unobserved characteristics into different regions has to be accounted for. To check for the
robustness of results to attrition bias I exclude the 10% of the sample who were most likely to drop out of the
panel (but did not). To correct for endogeneity of ethnic concentration I use ethnic concentration measured in the
year of the mother’s year of arrival in Germany or ethnic concentration in 1975 if the mother had arrived before
that year (because the ethnic concentration measure is not available for earlier years).
The main findings of this paper are:
1. The effect of the parents’ schooling in the educational attainment of immigrants’ children is much smaller
(about a fifth) than for natives’ children. This finding confirms results of earlier work by Gang and Zim-
mermann (2000) and Dustmann (2008). Parental schooling is more important for women’s educational
attainment while it seems to play no role for men.
2. Immigrants’ children who lived in regions with high ethnic concentrations attain lower levels of education.
3. Ethnic capital is economically and statistically insignificant. An additional year of schooling of the native
population is associated with 0.3 years of additional schooling for immigrants’ children (albeit with a high
standard error).
4. The mother’s education is an important determinant for women’s education, and ethnic concentration’s
effect on education is stronger for men.
The absence of any ethnic capital effect is an important finding and echoes similar results for Denmark in
Jakobsen and Smith (2003). The exploration of native capital externalities on 2nd generation immigrants is a
novelty in this paper. While the literature has considered the effect of ethnic capital and neighborhood effects in
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educational or employment outcomes of second generation immigrants, the role that native capital might play in
this context has not been explored theoretically nor empirically, with the exception of Borjas (1995) who found
that a small number of neighborhood characteristics including the educational composition of the neighborhood
accounts for most of the ethnic capital effect.
The question addressed in this paper lies at the nexus of several research areas. It is related to the vast
literatures of intergenerational human capital mobility both in general – recent examples including Black et
al. (2005) or Bleakley and Chin (2008), and for the German case Heineck and Riphahn (2007) or Casey and
Dustmann (2005) – and for immigrants in particular.3 The paper is further related to the neighborhood or, more
generally, the social capital literature, in particular studies of children’s outcomes. An early and influential paper
in economics is Case and Katz (1991), who find substantial neighborhood effects for disadvantaged youth in
Boston. Ginther et al. (2000) review some of the earlier literature and demonstrate the sensitivity of neighborhood
effects on children’s outcomes (including high-school graduation) to the inclusion of household variables. More
recent studies finding significant effects of peers and neighborhoods on children’s educational outcomes include
Goux and Maurin (2006) and Rury (2004). Raaum et al. (2006) find negligible, if any, neighborhood effects for
Norway. Bobonis and Finan (2009) provide evidence of peer effects on secondary school enrollment in Mexican
villages using a randomized controlled trial conducted to evaluate a policy intervention.
A closer relation exists to studies which have explicitly looked at the role of ethnic capital or network effects
in the context of the intergenerational transmission of education, Borjas (1992) and Borjas (1995) being the pio-
neering papers. Gang and Zimmermann (2000) study the schooling attainment of second generation immigrants
who were born in Germany or arrived before the age of 16. The authors find that immigrants’ education has no
effect on the educational attainment of their children (contrary to natives’ education on their children) and that
there is a positive group size effect. However, the latter is measured as the number of immigrants belonging to
the group in Germany and must be considered a rather crude measure of network effects. A˚slund et al. (2011)
find a positive externality of ethnic capital on children’s GPA rank. Their study enjoys the advantage of an ex-
ogenous initial allocation of refugee immigrants to Swedish municipalities. A comparison of estimates based
3For example Van Ours and Veenman (2003), Belzil and Poinas (2010), and Riphahn (2003) for Germany.
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on initial locations with later residence locations reveal that less educated immigrants sort into ethnically con-
centrated neighborhoods, creating a severe downward bias of ethnic concentration coefficients on educational
attainment. Nielsen et al. (2003) consider the role of ethnic capital and neighborhood characteristics in various
school-to-work transition measures of second generation immigrants with a rather mixed set of results: ethnic
capital seems to prolong the waiting time till entering the first job, but only for females, and seems to play no
discernible role other than that. Ethnic concentration increases the same duration for males, and decreases it for
females, and is associated with a longer first-job tenure for females, and a shorter first-job tenure for males. The
authors control for several neighborhood characteristics, but do not have a measure for native capital. Jakobsen
and Smith (2003) find that the concentration of 1st and 2nd generation immigrants in the childhood municipality
reduces the probability of finishing a qualifying education, whereas ethnic capital has no impact.
The concept of ethnic – or social – capital is admittedly vague. It is thus important to stress what this paper
does and does not do. What this paper does is to analyze the presence, direction and magnitude of externalities
exerted by the educational quality of immigrants and natives on the second generation of immigrants. It does
not attempt a dissection of the concept of ethnic capital. In other words, it can not distinguish between different
channels through which these externalities might operate on an individual level (e.g. peer effects, exogenous
effects, or endogenous effects in the sense of Manski (1993)), which is the main limitation of this study. The next
section extends the Borjas (1992) model to include native capital and ethnic concentrations. The third section
discusses the data and the construction of the variables of interest, the fourth section describes the estimation
and the strategy to deal with panel attrition and selection into regions. The fifth section presents results before I
conclude with the sixth section.
2 Theory
Consider the ethnic capital model of Borjas (1992). An ethnic household consists of a parent and a child. The
parent has a CES utility function defined over the child’s human capital ht+1 and his own consumption Ct
U = [δ1h
ρ
t+1+δ2C
ρ
t ]
1/ρ (1)
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with ρ < 1 and σ = 1/(1−ρ) is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and child quality. The parent
can divide his time between “renting out” his own human capital at a rate R and devoting it to his child’s human
capital production. With the price of the consumption good normalized to 1, the budget constraint is
R(1− st)ht =Ct (2)
where st is the fraction of time devoted to the child, Ct is the parent’s consumption, and ht his human capital. I
modify the production function for the child’s human capital production in Borjas (1992)
ht+1 = β0 (stht)
β1 h¯
β2(θ)
t,e h¯
β3(θ)
t,n (3)
The child’s human capital is produced with parental input, consisting of time devoted and the parent’s own human
capital, with ethnic capital h¯t,e, and with native capital h¯t,n. The relative weights of ethnic and native capital are
allowed to vary according to the share of ethnics in a pre-defined locality (neighborhood, school district, city,
etc), denoted by θ.4 Thus, the parent’s problem is characterized by
max
st
U =
[
δ1
(
β0 (stht)
β1 h¯
β2(θ)
t,e h¯
β3(θ)
t,n
)ρ
+δ2 (R(1− st)ht)
ρ
]1/ρ
(4)
The inclusion of native capital and the role of the share of ethnics is motivated by the possibility that natives
and ethnics can be substitutes (or complements) in the constitution of the relevant externality in human capital
production. Imagine two ethnic households with equal parental human capital, one living in an ethnic enclave,
the other in a mainly native region. It is conceivable that ethnic capital plays a larger role in the education of the
former child (e.g. through peer effects, role models, etc) while for the latter child the natives in the region form
the only reference group (see Currarini et al. (2009) for a theoretical motivation of the interaction between group
sizes and network formation). The dependence of the weight of the two forms of capital on the share of ethnics
is left unspecified, but it seems reasonable to expect a priori a larger role for ethnic capital when the exposure of
the child to it is higher.
4There are different ways to introduce ethnic and/or native capital externalities into the education of a child. An earlier version of this
paper has used a model in which children had a preference over conforming to other children of the same ethnicity.
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Solving the parents maximization problem results in the following equations:
∂ logst
∂ loght
=
ρ(1− st)(β1−1)
(1− st)(1−β1ρ)+ st(1−ρ)
∂ logst
∂ log h¯t,e
=
ρ(1− st)β2(θ)
(1− st)(1−β1ρ)+ st(1−ρ)
∂ logst
∂ log h¯t,n
=
ρ(1− st)β3(θ)
(1− st)(1−β1ρ)+ st(1−ρ)
Taking logs of the human capital production equation, differentiating, and using the preceding results give:
∂ loght+1
∂ loght
=
β1(1−ρ)
(1− st)(1−ρβ1)+ st(1−ρ)
> 0 (5)
∂ loght+1
∂ log h¯t,e
=
β2(θ)(1−ρst)
(1− st)(1−ρβ1)+ st(1−ρ)
> 0 (6)
∂ loght+1
∂ log h¯t,n
=
β3(θ)(1−ρst)
(1− st)(1−ρβ1)+ st(1−ρ)
> 0 (7)
Thus, the child’s human capital is increasing in its parent’s human capital, in ethnic capital, and in native
capital. The signs of
∂2 loght+1
∂ log h¯t,e∂θ
and
∂2 loght+1
∂ log h¯t,n∂θ
are an empirical question. I conjecture that the former is positive, and the latter negative. Intuitively, if ethnic
concentration is high, ethnic capital should exert a stronger and native capital a weaker externality.
3 Data
The sample of immigrants, their children, and their individual characteristics come from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP). The earliest wave of the SOEP that allows identification of the county of residence of
households is the 1985 wave. I include all children aged 0 to 16 (some of whom were not born in Germany)
in the 1985 wave and, tracking those individuals over all waves up to and including 2010, extract their years
of schooling. The most numerous immigrant groups in the SOEP will be considered in this paper. Those are
immigrants from Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, Italy, Spain, and Greece. Regional aggregates for the years
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1975-1995 are projected from the Employee Sample (IABS) – a 2% sample of the employee population in
Germany subject to social security payments. See Bender et al. (2000) for a detailed description of this dataset.
3.1 Individual and household characteristics
The outcome variable of interest is educational attainment of immigrants’ children, measured as years of school-
ing. Explanatory variables at the individual or household level are a gender dummy, the mother’s years of
schooling5, monthly net household income6, a dummy for the mother having had any schooling in Germany, a
measure of the mother’s German speaking ability, the mother’s age at migration, the number of adult household
members, the number of children in the household, a dummy for the child not being born in Germany, and the
year of birth.
The inclusion of the language variable is due to the evidence that the language spoken at home is an important
determinant in the educational achievements of immigrants’ children presented in Dustmann et al. (2010) and
Dustmann and Glitz (2011). It is measured on an integer scale from 1 (speaking very well) to 5 (not speaking at
all). I use the average speaking ability reported in the survey years 1985-1995 to minimize issues of measurement
error. The year of birth is intended to capture a secular increase in the educational attainment in Germany over
the last decades, documented by Heineck and Riphahn (2007) and Bildungsbericht (2008). Younger cohorts are
more likely to finish high-school and to attend higher education.
3.2 Regional variables
Regional variables are ethnic capital, native capital, ethnic concentration, and interactions between ethnic capital
and ethnic concentration as well as native capital and ethnic concentration. For a given year these aggregates are
defined for 142 different regions (every region being tied to a local office of the German Employment Agency)
in Germany, including West Berlin, and the five aforementioned ethnicities using the IABS. These regions are
5Regressions with the father’s characteristics are run as a robustness check. See results section.
6Averaged over the reported incomes when the child was aged 6 through 10, and deflated to 1985 values by assuming an annual
inflation rate of 2%.
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metropolitan areas and their suburbs, or groups of economically tied counties. The population of West Germany
in 1990 was 63.7 million, making the average population of a region approximately 450,000. The choice of
the number of regions is a compromise between choosing small regions, thus more accurately capturing the
geography in which most interactions of its inhabitants take place, and larger regions, thus preserving larger
samples per region to more accurately measure regional variables and decrease attenuation bias.
Ethnic concentration is defined as the share of employees aged 18 to 64 of an ethnicity in a region in all
employees aged 18 to 64 of that region. Ethnic capital is defined as the average years of schooling of all
employees of an ethnicity in a region. The construction of these regional variables has some shortcomings. First,
the variables are based on region of employment rather than region of residence (though the regions are rather
large, so that the two are often likely to coincide). Second, the fragmentation of the sample into 142 regions and 5
ethnicities introduces considerable measurement error due to small cell-sample sizes. Third, measurement error
is also due to the sample including only employees or transfer recipients. Individuals not in the labor force are not
in the population from which the sample is drawn. This might be an important omission if different ethnicities
have different participation rates. Finally, the education variable in the IABS exhibits some inconsistencies over
time (such as a regression in the educational attainment of an individual) and a high number of missing values. I
use the imputation and correction procedures from Fitzenberger et al. (2005) to construct the years of schooling.7
The regional variables enter the regressions through the degree of exposure that the immigrants’ child had
to them at the ages 6 through 10.8 Every year is equally weighted. For example, if child i of ethnicity j is
8 in 1985 and lives in region 1 in 1985 and 1986, and in region 2 in 1987, then the following ethnic capital
value is assigned to it: Ci, j = (1/3)∗Cr=1, j,t=1985+(1/3)∗Cr=1, j,t=1986+(1/3)∗Cr=2, j,t=1987 where r denotes
the region, t the year, and C denotes ethnic capital. The same weighting is applied to ethnic concentration and
to native capital. Children whose residence at or before age 10 is not known are assigned 0 for the regional
variables, but are marked by a dummy variable (denoted after10). The ages 6 through 10 are chosen as the
relevant exposure time because of the structure of the German educational system in the 1980s and early 1990s.
7The results reported here use the imputation rule 1. Results with imputation rules 2 and 3 are similar and can be requested from the
author.
8I have also tried exposure windows of 6 to 12 and 6 to 15. The results remained unchanged.
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Children typically were enrolled in primary school at the age of 6. During fourth grade teachers recommended
one of several secondary education school types for the child, depending on what they believed to be the child’s
educational potential. Traditionally there have been three different school types, the Hauptschule providing a
basic secondary education, the Realschule being more advanced than the former, and the Gymnasium intended
to prepare schoolchildren for university. Few school switches occurred after this initial assignment.9
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Summary statistics for individual characteristics are presented in table 1. The table reports statistics on the vari-
ables of interest separately for natives’ and immigrants’ children separated by ethnicity. Children of immigrants
attain lower levels of education than their native peers. The ranking of their years of schooling corresponds
roughly to the ranking in education among their mothers, suggesting an important role for the intergenerational
transmission of education. Turkish mothers have considerably worse German skills than other ethnicities, and
Greek households have the highest income levels. 36% of the Turkish children were not born in Germany. We
also see that Turkish and Greek children had exposure to lower degrees of ethnic capital, and Turkish and Yu-
goslavian children had the highest exposure to their respective ethnic concentrations, reflecting the fact that these
immigrant groups were the largest in the 1980s.
Table 2 reports unweighted averages of the regional variables (averaged over all regions). Ethnic capital
averages are reflected closely in the sample statistics in table 1. Ethnic concentrations in the sample are higher
because immigrants are more likely to live in and be sampled from regions with high ethnic concentrations.
The table also illustrates that regional variables will be measured with considerable error, especially for smaller
immigrant groups such as Greeks and Spaniards. There are 1,196 Spaniards in the IABS in 1985, observed in
121 regions. Thus, for Spaniards regional variables will be based on average on only 10 Spanish observations
per region.
Table 3 reports the inter-regional correlations of ethnic concentrations. All correlations are positive and
9According to the Bildungsbericht 2008, a report on education in Germany published by the state ministries of education and the
federal ministry of education and research, 3% of children in grades 7-9 switched school types in 2006/2007.
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highly significant, pointing to the fact that immigrants of different ethnicities cluster in the same regions. This
reflects that these groups of immigrants were recruited for similar work tasks in similar industries.
4 Estimation
I estimate the following equation:
yi = β0+β1yi,mother + γ
′Xi +δ
′Yi + εi (8)
with yi being years of schooling of observation i, and yi,mother the years of schooling of the mother of i. Xi is
a vector of other control variables, Yi is a vector of regional variables (ethnic and native capital, ethnic concen-
tration, and interactions) and εi is the residual. To handle multiple children belonging to the same household
all regressions will be clustered at the 1985 household level. Results for this benchmark model are reported in
table 4 and will be discussed in the results section.
4.1 Attrition and Endogeneity
To observe the completed years of education of a new-born child in 1985, the child would have to be followed
for at least 16 years, and in some cases for as long as 25 to 30 years. Panel attrition is thus substantial, and it
is more so for immigrant households since return migration is an additional source of attrition. There are 1,133
observations of immigrants’ children with information on all explanatory variables, but only 687 for whom
completed years of schooling are observed (61% retention). For natives 1,389 out of 1,935 observations have
information on years of schooling (72% retention). Furthermore, the residence of an immigrant is clearly a choice
variable and it is likely – at least for some immigrants – that the educational “environment” for their children
plays some role in that decision. If immigrants with stronger preferences towards their children’s education
move to “better” regions (with higher ethnic and/or native capital), then a simple regression might attribute
higher educational attainments of these children to ethnic and/or native capital, even though it might to some
extent be due to more parental investment.
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To assess the impact of these issues I exclude those 10% of the sample who had the highest predicted
probability to attrite. Probabilities were predicted from a probit regression with the dependent variable being
an indicator for whether the observation has information on completed years of schooling. This information is
missing for observations which have discontinued participation in the panel (through refusal, return migration,
death, etc). The explanatory variables are all variables included in the regression of equation 8 and additionally
a full set of year-of-birth dummies and an indicator equalling one if in the 1985 survey the parents stated an
intention to return to their native country within a few years. The coefficient on the intention to return was
-0.241 with a standard error of 0.1 (Pseudo-R2 in this regression was 0.23, see table 8 in the appendix).
Even though all regional variables come as a “packet” with the choice of residence, for lack of good in-
struments I treat only ethnic concentration as endogenous given its prominence in the regression results and the
high cross-regional correlations of ethnic concentration among different immigrant groups. The instrument in
the regression of ethnic concentration is the mother’s year-of-immigration ethnic concentration in the region of
residence in 1985 if the mother immigrated in or after 1975, and the 1975 ethnic concentration in the region of
residence in 1985 if the mother immigrated before 1975 (ethnic concentrations before 1975 are not available).
Call this the initial ethnic concentration. The initial region of residence prior to 1973 was usually determined
by Germany’s federal employment agency. The guest-worker recruitment was stopped in 1973, and immigra-
tion from the countries considered in this paper continued in the 1970s mainly for family reunification. Ethnic
concentrations in the year of immigration and in the initial period after immigration are thus assumed exogenous
to immigrants’ ability and inclination to invest in their children’s education, but exhibit strong correlations with
subsequent ethnic concentrations.
5 Results
A first set of results is reported in table 4. The first four columns are results for immigrants’ children, the last
two columns are results for natives’ children. The difference in the determinants of years of schooling between
natives’ and immigrants’ children is striking. Intergenerational transmission of education is much stronger for
natives, confirming the finding in Gang and Zimmermann (2000) and Dustmann (2008). Equally, household
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income in native households is a strong predictor for educational attainment, but not in immigrant households.
Daughters of natives attain more schooling than sons, but not significantly so. Again, the effect is absent for
immigrants’ children. Looking at determinants specific to immigrants, we see that German skills (1 speaks
very well, 5 does not speak at all) increase the child’s education, but not significantly so. Children who were
born in Germany enjoy an educational advantage of some 7 months of schooling. Even when only household
variables are included and when the same regressors are used a significant difference between mother’s education
coefficients between the native and the immigrant samples remains (not reported).
For the regional variables – ethnic and native capital, ethnic concentration (native concentration for natives),
and an interaction term of the two – we observe a nuanced picture. If only ethnic capital and ethnic concentration
are included (column 2), ethnic concentration has a significantly negative effect. The coefficient of ethnic capital
is virtually zero. For natives (column 5), the effects of both of those variables are small and insignificant. The
effect of native capital (in column 3) is statistically insignificant but much larger in magnitude compared to
the coefficient of ethnic capital.10 Including interaction terms (column 4, and column 6 for natives’ children)
predictably changes the coefficients of the other regional variables, but they are neither individually nor jointly
significant. Both are negative which is contrary to our expectation with regard to ethnic capital, but in line with
our expectation with regard to native capital (any positive effect of native capital is diminished as the ethnic
concentration increases). The individual and household determinants are mostly unchanged by the inclusion of
regional variables (except for the dummy indicating whether the mother has had any education in Germany).
Table 5 shows results for the regional variables obtained after excluding the observation who were most likely
to attrite and for the 2SLS results with ethnic concentration instrumented by initial ethnic concentration. We see
that the coefficient of ethnic concentration becomes smaller in magnitude in the restricted sample suggesting
that attrition could be biasing the concentration coefficient downward. We also observe that the magnitude of
the coefficient on ethnic concentration is 10% smaller in the 2SLS regression than in the OLS regression. The
upward correction of the ethnic concentration effect is in line with the selection of regions with low ethnic
concentrations by immigrants who have stronger preferences over their children’s education, and who might be
10The correlation coefficient between ethnic and native capital among those observations for whom the variables are measured – that
is those observations whose region of residence is observed for at least some time when they are aged 6 to 10 – is 0.28.
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moving to those regions in the expectation that it will benefit their children.
Table 6 reports separate results for males and females. The first two columns use mother’s years of schooling
as parental capital. Mother’s education does not play a role in the schooling of men, but it has a significant
effect on women’s education. Still, the effect of mother’s education is only about two thirds of the effect for
natives. Ethnic and native capital seem to play more important roles for men. The insignificance of the mother’s
education for men could be due to boys choosing their fathers as role models, but as the results in columns 3 and
4 indicate, the father’s education plays no role for men, and is insignificant and smaller compared to mother’s
education for women.
Table 7 reports some robustness and sub-sample results. Column 2 reports results when including two
additional regional variables – the share of employees working in mining, manufacturing, or construction, and
the median wage in the region. The magnitude of the ethnic concentration coefficient increases by 40% while
the other coefficients remain largely unchanged relative to the benchmark model (column 1). Including a set
of state dummies defined over the state of residence in 1985 (column 3) has no discernible effect. The forth
column reports results from a sample using only observations for whom information on their residence at any
point between ages 6 and 10 is available. Results are similar to the benchmark model (column 1). Looking
at observations who were born in Germany only, some important differences arise. First, mother’s education
becomes completely unimportant, and second, the regional variables’ importance increases, with the familiar
result that native capital exerts a positive, and ethnic concentration a negative influence.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the determinants of educational achievement of immigrants’ children in Germany, with
a focus on the role played by regional aggregates such as ethnic concentration, ethnic capital, and native capital.
Results show that 1) household variables – and in particular the parents’ education – play a minor role, especially
in comparison to natives’ children, 2) ethnic concentrations have a negative effect, 3) ethnic capital has no effect,
4) native capital has a positive (though insignificant) effect, and 5) there are important differences in the relative
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importance of those variables between men and women.
The first result could be a feature of low and rather homogenous educational levels of first generation immi-
grants, especially within, but also between immigrant groups. One has to keep in mind that the immigrant groups
considered in this paper were for the most part recruited for work with little skill requirements. The second result
points strongly to the possibility that ethnic neighborhoods act as an impediment to educational attainment. It
seems unlikely that this is a regional effect, since the effect is absent for natives, and it persists even after con-
trolling for other regional variables and 1985 state-of-residence dummy variables. The impeding effect of ethnic
neighborhoods could be due to the children failing to learn proper German before school enrolment or to more
network based alternatives in the local labor market, increasing the opportunity cost of staying in education.
The third result constitutes a refutation of the ethnic capital model, at least for the case of Germany. The
native capital coefficient has the predicted sign and its magnitude is much larger than the ethnic capital coef-
ficient. Furthermore, the results show that there is some interplay between those two variables. Inclusion of
native capital typically decreases the coefficient on ethnic capital. While it is improbable to shed more light into
this relationship with household survey data, the results highlight the importance of considering native capital as
much as ethnic capital when immigrants’ educational attainments are analyzed.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics, Immigrants’ children
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Turkey Yugoslavia Italy Spain Greece Natives
Years of schooling (mean) 10.3 10.6 10.4 10.4 10.7 11.8
Mother’s years of schooling (mean) 8.0 8.9 8.4 8.0 8.7 10.8
Mother’s age at migration (mean) 26.3 22.6 22.9 22.4 21.1 n.a.
Mother’s German skills (1 to 5) 3.5 2.5 3.0 2.7 2.7 n.a.
Household income (mean) 1,188 1,356 1,160 1,380 1,695 1,579
Male (%) 54 50 50 63 52 51
Immigrant (%) 36 29 24 15 11 n.a.
Adult household members (mean) 2.7 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.3
Children in household (mean) 3.0 2.5 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9
Ethnic capital (mean) 9.9 10.5 10.2 10.5 9.9 12.2
Ethnic concentration (mean) 2.9 2.7 1.9 0.5 1.0 94.2
observations 289 155 112 52 79 1,389
Source: SOEP 1985-2010.
Table 2: Summary statistics, Regional variables 1985
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Turkey Yugoslavia Italy Spain Greece Natives
Ethnic capital 9.9 10.5 10.3 10.3 10.0
(0.5) (0.6) (0.8) (1.0) (1.1)
Ethnic concentration 2.1 1.4 1.0 0.4 0.5
(1.2) (1.3) (1.0) (0.3) (0.5)
Native capital 12.1 12.1 12.2 12.2 12.2 12.1
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
number of regions
with observations 141 140 131 121 125 142
number of observations
in IABS 8,275 5,937 3,644 1,196 1,925 315,588
Source: IABS. Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 3: Regional correlations of ethnic concentrations, 1985
Turkey Yugoslavia Italy Spain Greece
Turkey 1.00
Yugoslavia 0.47 1.00
Italy 0.35 0.63 1.00
Spain 0.31 0.28 0.47 1.00
Greece 0.43 0.59 0.53 0.43 1.00
Correlations of ethnic concentrations between over 148 regions of West-Germany, including West-Berlin. Source: IABS.
18
Table 4: Determinants of years of schooling
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Immigrants’ children
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Natives’ children
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mother’s education 0.074 0.080 0.079 0.076 0.314*** 0.314***
(0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.053) (0.053)
Household income -0.032 -0.025 -0.024 -0.021 0.446*** 0.446***
in 1,000 Euros (0.049) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.118) (0.118)
Male 0.011 0.016 0.023 0.023 -0.191 -0.191
(0.169) (0.168) (0.168) (0.168) (0.138) (0.138)
Adults in household 0.071 0.061 0.057 0.056 -0.363*** -0.363***
(0.122) (0.124) (0.124) (0.123) (0.097) (0.097)
Children in household -0.183 -0.188* -0.184* -0.186* 0.005 0.005
(0.116) (0.108) (0.110) (0.110) (0.103) (0.103)
Mother’s German skills -0.200 -0.181 -0.179 -0.180
(0.152) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149)
Mother any education -0.955** -0.894* -0.842* -0.798*
in Germany (0.455) (0.472) (0.466) (0.481)
Mother’s age at -0.014 -0.016 -0.017 -0.017
migration (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Not born in Germany -0.605*** -0.614*** -0.621*** -0.601***
(0.228) (0.229) (0.230) (0.228)
Concentration own -0.180** -0.203*** 1.104 -0.004 0.068
ethnicity (0.075) (0.078) (2.035) (0.025) (0.734)
Ethnic capital 0.020 -0.018 0.015
(0.113) (0.116) (0.150)
Native capital 0.266 0.488 -0.223 0.315
(0.258) (0.413) (0.224) (5.506)
Ethnic concentration* -0.015
Ethnic capital (0.088)
Ethnic concentration* -0.093 -0.006
Native capital (0.183) (0.059)
Constant -23.0 -22.5 -12.6 -16.4 13.2 6.2
(52.2) (51.9) (53.7) (53.8) (34.5) (80.9)
Observations 687 687 687 687 1,389 1,389
R-squared 0.079 0.087 0.089 0.089 0.106 0.106
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the 1985 household level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: Years of schooling. Other controls: Ethnic fixed effects, year of birth, dummy if residence before age 11
unobserved. Source: SOEP 1985-2010.
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Table 5: Determinants of years of schooling, sample selection and endogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model Baseline Attrition Endogeneity (2) and (3)
Mother’s education 0.079 0.105 0.080 0.104
(0.070) (0.073) (0.069) (0.072)
Ethnic concentration -0.203*** -0.175** -0.181** -0.146
(0.078) (0.082) (0.091) (0.096)
Ethnic capital -0.018 0.006 0.020 0.027
(0.116) (0.117) (0.113) (0.115)
Native capital 0.266 0.130
(0.258) (0.275)
Excluding those with no yes no yes
high attrition prob
2nd stage IV no no yes yes
Constant -12.622 -1.510 -22.501 -5.044
(53.698) (60.130) (51.177) (58.196)
Observations 687 619 687 619
R-squared 0.089 0.093 0.087 0.092
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the 1985 household level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: Years of schooling. Other controls: Same as in table 4. Source: SOEP 1985-2010.
Table 6: Results by gender and by parent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men Women Men Women
Mother’s education Mother’s education Father’s education Father’s education
Parent’s education -0.076 0.240** 0.018 0.153
(0.082) (0.095) (0.073) (0.093)
Ethnic concentration -0.197** -0.176 -0.248** -0.173
(0.100) (0.115) (0.099) (0.136)
Ethnic capital 0.039 -0.073 -0.002 -0.189
(0.165) (0.171) (0.167) (0.208)
Native capital 0.184 0.146 0.289 -0.049
(0.350) (0.367) (0.335) (0.396)
Constant 8.8 -47.5 2.9 -120.4
(67.2) (82.9) (66.3) (85.2)
Observations 363 324 372 330
R-squared 0.099 0.135 0.119 0.130
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the 1985 household level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: Years of schooling. Other controls: Same as in table 4. Source: SOEP 1985-2010.
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Table 7: Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full sample Full sample Full sample measured exposure Born in Germany
Mother’s education 0.079 0.093 0.081 0.107 0.008
(0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.074) (0.084)
Ethnic concentration -0.203*** -0.281*** -0.203** -0.176** -0.228**
(0.078) (0.083) (0.094) (0.083) (0.092)
Ethnic capital -0.018 -0.014 0.004 0.027 -0.045
(0.116) (0.116) (0.131) (0.121) (0.167)
Native capital 0.266 0.248 0.286 0.243 0.422
(0.258) (0.538) (0.312) (0.260) (0.317)
Other regional controls no yes no no no
1985 residence dummies no no yes no no
Constant -12.6 53.2 0.4 -9.3 17.6
(53.7) (72.5) (56.5) (56.0) (61.5)
Observations 687 687 687 597 493
R-squared 0.103 0.109 0.116 0.082 0.080
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the 1985 household level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: Years of schooling. Other controls: Same as in table 4. Source: SOEP 1985-2010.
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Appendix
Table 8: Probit regression of panel attrition
Mother’s education -0.044
(0.028)
Mother any education -0.412**
in Germany (0.186)
Household income -0.015
in 1,000 Euros (0.046)
Mother’s German skills -0.159**
(0.068)
Male 0.037
(0.087)
Not born in Germany 0.284**
(0.140)
Mother’s age at -0.015*
migration (0.008)
Adults in household 0.002
(0.056)
Children in household 0.115***
(0.043)
Ethnic concentration -0.054
(0.038)
Ethnic capital 0.005
(0.066)
Native capital -0.008
(0.137)
Intends to return -0.241**
(0.100)
Constant 0.420
(1.745)
Observations 1,118
Pseudo R-squared 0.231
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: Dummy variable for staying in panel till completion of education. Other controls: Ethnic fixed effects, year of birth
dummies, dummy if residence before age 11 unobserved. Source: SOEP 1985-2010.
22
